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Abstract

How does the quality of national institutions that enforce rule of law influence international
trade? Anderson and Marcouiller (2001) argue that bad institutions located in the importer’s
country deter international trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort at the
importer’s border. We complement this research and show how good institutions located in the
exporter’s country enhance international trade and, in particular, trade in complex products whose
characteristics are difficult to fully specify in a contract. We build a model in which both
exporter and importer institutions impact both international and domestic transaction costs in
complex and simple product markets. While international transaction costs affect the costs of
trade, domestic transaction costs affect complex and simple products differently, thereby
changing comparative advantage. We find strong evidence for the model’s predictions: most
notably, the quality of exporter institutions is most important for enhancing trade in complex
product markets and the quality of importer institutions is most important for simple markets.
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I. Introduction
Before entering into trade agreements, exporters must believe they will receive timely
and appropriate payment with sufficiently high probability, and importers must believe they will
receive timely shipment of appropriate products with sufficiently high probability. In this paper
we focus on the ways in which formal national institutions such as courts, tax collection agencies
and bureaucracies that enforce contracts and protect property rights can provide appropriate
assurance to exporters and importers and thereby foster mutually beneficial trade.1 James
Anderson and Douglas Marcouiller (2001) (hereafter, denoted A&M) show that when these
institutions are ineffective, corrupt government officials and other predators are able to steal and
to collect bribes from traders at the importer’s border. Their empirical work shows that bad
institutions located in the importer’s country raise international transaction costs and deter
international trade. We complement this research: we show how good institutions located in the
exporter’s country can enhance international trade, in particular trade in complex products that
are highly differentiated and contain many characteristics that are difficult to fully stipulate in a
contract.
When the rule of law within the importer’s country breaks down, economic predators can
hold up shipments at the border. This, in turn, increases both the exporter’s risk of not receiving
payments and the importer’s risk of receiving an inappropriate shipment. However, as noted by
Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer (1995), efficient international trade agreements also break
down when it is lucrative for the importer to withhold payment from the exporter, and when it is
also profitable for the exporter to produce a substandard product. We focus on the role that
institutions located in the exporter’s domicile play in offsetting the importer’s risk of receiving a
substandard shipment. Specifically, contracts negotiated between exporters and importers—
including letters of credit, counter-trade agreements and pre-payment—are broadly and
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effectively used in international trade to offset the exporter’s risk of not getting paid. However,
similar contracts are less effective and, as such, are much less broadly employed to offset the
importer’s risk. For example, while importers can use a letter of acceptance to withhold payment
until the state of the goods received is verified, the acceptance periods are short and defects that
are difficult to verify may become apparent only later.2 Therefore, it is primarily importers that
rely on formal institutions such as courts and arbitration tribunals for seeking compensation.
The quality of institutions in the exporter’s domicile is critical for offsetting importer risk
because these institutions are the last fallback for resolving disputes over the quality and
assortment of shipments. Parties can agree in their contract to resolve the dispute in the importer’s
court, the exporter’s court, a court in a third country, or they might use an international arbitration
tribunal (i.e. the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International
Arbitration, or the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre), an arbitration board at a trade
association, or agree to ad hoc arbitration. In international transactions, arbitration clauses are
common because arbitration is less formal, quicker, and ensures greater expertise of those hearing
and deciding the case than ordinary domestic courts. However, courts and arbitration tribunals
have similar problems compensating the winning party. For example, in the case of court
litigation, the importer as plaintiff pays court fees before the hearing proceeds. In general, if the
exporter wins it is relatively easy for the court to enforce this ruling because it simply uses a share
of the court fees that importer has paid in advance to pay the exporter. If the importer wins, his
award will comprise a new shipment of products or monetary compensation, and he is supposed
to be reimbursed for the court fees. It is more difficult for the court to enforce this second ruling
because the court must force the exporter to compensate the importer for the court fees and either
re-send a satisfactory product or compensate the importer for the value of the proper product and
1

For the literature on the incentives of individual exporters and importers to enforce trade agreements when
these modern institutions are weak or even absent, see Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990), Grief (1992,
1993), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) and Anderson and Young (2000).
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any additional losses he may have suffered. If the exporter has assets in the importer’s country or
in a third country, then the importer can use the court system within that country to seize the
exporter’s assets. If not, however, the importer depends upon institutions in the exporter’s
country. Because the exporter is most likely to keep the bulk of its assets in its home jurisdiction,
and because the nation state is sovereign and therefore foreign bailiffs cannot be employed, the
quality of the exporter country’s institutions is critical. When the exporter loses and does not
comply with a ruling, the court system in the exporter’s country becomes the last resort for
enforcement of the ruling, and its ability to make and enforce good decisions depends upon the
overall quality of institutions within its country.
We build a model of institutions and trade that draws upon the following ideas. First, the
exporter’s risk of non-payment is effectively offset by contractual means. Second, good
institutions in the exporter’s domicile are critical for offsetting the importer’s risk of receiving an
inappropriate shipment because contractual methods for offsetting this risk are ineffective. Third,
it is more difficult for institutions in the exporter’s country to enforce trade contracts for complex
versus simple products. Complex products are differentiated and contain many characteristics,
including size, design, material, and other specifications; thus, it is impossible to fully stipulate an
order for these products in a formal contract.3 Because contracts are less complete for complex
products versus simple products, it is more difficult for institutions to determine whether a
contract for complex products has been breached or fulfilled. Fourth, following A&M (2001), the
predator’s costs of stealing does not depend upon product complexity: therefore, bad importer
institutions have a similar impact on simple and complex products. Fifth, firms that want to buy
inputs and outsource on the domestic markets also depend upon their domestic institutions to
limit stealing and corruption and to enforce contracts.

2

Under the Convention of the International Sale of Goods (CISG), for example, the importer is obliged to
examine the goods for defects “within as short a period as is practicable” after delivery. See Art. 38 CISG.
3
Ongoing work in contract theory argues that it is impossible specify a complete contract for even the
simplest products. See Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1999).
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We generate testable predictions regarding the impact of exporter and importer
institutions on world trade in complex and simple products by extending the Rudiger Dornbush et
al. (1997) Ricardian model. In our version of the model, good importer institutions reduce
international transaction costs by lowering predation risk, good exporter institutions reduce
transaction costs primarily in complex product markets by eliminating the exporter’s incentive to
shirk, and good domestic institutions increase a country’s comparative advantage in complex
products. The model makes clear predictions about the impact of good institutions on domestic
and international transaction costs, and about trade in complex and simple products. We find
strong evidence in the data to support the model’s predictions. Most importantly, we find that the
overall impact of exporter institutions is strongest in complex product markets and the overall
impact of importer institutions is strongest in simple product markets. We also find that the
impact of institutions on transaction costs is strongest in complex product markets. Finally, the
impact of institutions on trade is comparable to other standard determinants such as GNP per
capita, distance between countries and language differences. The results imply that policies that
increase the quality of legal institutions will have a substantial impact on trade by deterring
predators both in the importer’s and the exporter’s countries, by encouraging exporters to make a
good faith effort to fulfill their contractual obligations, and by enabling producers to cheaply
outsource within their domestic markets, thus influencing comparative advantage.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the relationship between institutions and
trade. This literature includes the work of James Anderson and Douglas Marcouiller (2001) and
Helena Svaleryd and Janos Vlachos (2001), who show that strong financial institutions encourage
countries to be more open to aggregate trade. Arvind Subramanian, Dani Rodrik and Francesco
Trebbi (October, 2002) show that institutions cause trade; our paper analyzes the impact of
exporter and importer institutions on trade in simple and complex products.
The next section shows how international transaction costs depend upon product
complexity as well as exporter and importer institutions; section III builds a general equilibrium
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model of institutions and trade and derives testable predictions. Sections IV and V describe the
data and our estimation procedure. Section VI reports empirical results, and section VII
concludes.

II. Institutions, Complexity and Transaction Costs
As noted by James Anderson (2001), crossing an international border imposes substantial
costs because it generally indicates the point where formal taxes are imposed and where informal
groups extort bribes. The A&M (2001) model shows how high quality importer institutions can
limit the expected gains from piracy and bribes and thereby reduce transaction costs. A&M
assume that costs imposed by predators do not depend upon product complexity. Incorporating
their results in a reduced form, define s(Iimp) as the expected share of goods that survives
predation, where Iimp is the quality of importer legal institutions, and s ∈ [0,1) is increasing in Iimp.
Let τ (⋅) denote the expected share of goods that survives for standard reasons including distance,
differences in trading blocs, etc (see James Rauch (1999)). Let r( ⋅ ) denote the expected share of
an order that an importer believes will comply with his specifications (after netting out losses
from piracy and other transaction costs). Then ϕ ( I imp , ⋅) = r ( ⋅) s ( I imp ) τ ( ⋅) ∈ [0, 1] is the
overall share of products that survives and is received by the importer.
We informally derive the properties of r, where

r ( ⋅) = δ ( ⋅) + (1 − δ ( ⋅))[π ( ⋅) − (1− π ( ⋅))ψ ]

(1)

In equation (1) δ ( ⋅) is the probability that the importer is satisfied with the shipment, π ( ⋅) is
the probability that the importer is compensated if there is a breach of contract, and ψ denotes
legal costs (normalized as the share of the importer’s costs of the overall shipment) the importer
must pay if he decides to take the exporter to court for breach of contract.4 If the importer is suing

4

A formal derivation of equation (1) is available upon request. In the more general situation, the importer
can decide whether or not to go to court if there is a breach of contract, the importer can decide whether or
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the exporter for breach of contract, he typically must make an advance payment to cover the costs
of dispute settlement. If the importer loses, the court or arbitration tribunal simply keeps the
importer’s advance payment. If the importer wins, he is fully compensated for these costs and for
the value of the shipment. If there is a breach of contract and the importer takes the exporter to
court, then π ( ⋅) is the importer’s expected gain from taking legal action when he wins,

− (1− π ( ⋅))ψ is the importer’s expected loss if he loses. Therefore, at the time of the order, the
importer’s expected compensation (as a share of the initial order) if there is a breach of contract is

(1 − δ ( ⋅))[π ( ⋅) − (1− π ( ⋅))ψ ] .
The exporter has a greater incentive to make a good faith effort when she believes the
probability she will be punished for breach of contract is high. A good faith effort from the
exporter, in turn, increases the probability that the importer is satisfied. As complexity of an order
increases, it becomes more difficult to specify every detail and it is becomes more likely that the
importer will be dissatisfied even when the exporter makes a good faith effort. Therefore, the
probability that the importer is satisfied with the shipment, δ ( ⋅), depends upon enforcement,

π ( ⋅) , and product complexity, c. In summary,
δ = δ (π , c) : ∂δ / ∂π > 0, ∂δ / ∂c < 0 for δ ,π ∈[0,1)

(2)

High quality institutions in the exporter’s country, such as courts and agencies capable of
enforcing court rulings, are critical for enforcement, π ( ⋅). Enforcement can be more
problematic when the importer wins because the relevant institution must make the exporter
reimburse the importer for her advance coverage of costs, and it must make the exporter
compensate the importer. Because the exporter generally holds the bulk of her assets in her home
jurisdiction, institutions in her country become critical no matter where the hearing is held

not to pursue a frivolous lawsuit when the contract has been fulfilled, and the exporter can decide whether
or not to shirk. Equation (1) is a reduced form in which the high quality of institutions ensures that the
importer does not pursue frivolous lawsuits, the importer goes to court when there is a breach of contract,
and the importer can be sincerely dissatisfied when the exporter makes a good faith effort.
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because they are the last resort for resolving disputes over the fulfillment of her contract with the
importer.
The probability of enforcement, π ( ⋅) , increases when courts exercise impartiality in their
proceedings and rulings, and when courts are sufficiently competent to handle cases involving
complex goods. Impartiality refers to the absence of corruption and to the lack of any home bias
that may influence the court’s verdict. International treaties, in particular the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, have been
negotiated in order to mitigate home bias. The treaties commit countries that have ratified the
convention to enforcing foreign arbitral awards without a review of the substantive law. Domestic
courts may, however, review whether procedural requirements established in the Convention
have been observed, and whether the award is consistent with fundamental principles of public
interest (“ordre public”). One hundred and thirty-two countries have ratified the convention. Still,
a number of countries have not done so, and even some of those that have tend to use the “ordre
public” exemption to review the findings of the foreign arbitration bodies and frequently reject
their ruling as violating fundamental domestic policies.
To demonstrate the uncertainties trading partners face when enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards cannot be ensured, consider Brazil, which ratified the New York Convention
only in 2002. Until 1990, when the Supreme Court of Brazil changed its previous standard of
review, there was substantial uncertainty about the ability of parties to enforce arbitration awards
against Brazilian exporters (Samtleben, 1994). In one case, the plaintiff, a Dutch company, had
ordered 500 tons of peanut oil from a Brazilian exporter.5 The oil that was delivered turned out to
be defective. The parties had agreed on arbitration by a third party (FOSFA), which awarded the
Dutch company US$220,000 in damages. The British High Court confirmed the award.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Brazil refused to recognize the award; it refused to enforce
5

See Sup. Trib. Fed., 4 June 1980, Naamloze Vennotschap Bunge v. Industria de Oleos Paceambu S.A.
(original decision printed in Rev. TimrJur. 95, 1001).

7

this award in Brazil on the grounds that the Brazilian exporter had not been formally notified
about the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the law of Brazil. There are many cases prior
to 1990 in which Brazilian courts effectively set aside arbitration decisions against Brazilian
exporters by invoking procedural requirements unknown outside of Brazil (see Samtleben, 1989,
1994). Thus, if there was a breach of contract by a Brazilian exporter, importers were uncertain
whether an arbitration decision would be enforced. As a result, importers were often forced to
resort to using costly and highly idiosyncratic adjudication in Brazilian courts.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Brazil held that in cases (such as the above) where both
parties had participated in arbitration and had not challenged the procedural rules on the grounds
that they violated domestic law, no party could invoke these arguments at the recognitions stage.
In 1996, Brazil adopted a new arbitration law that confirms this new case law, and in 2002 it
adopted the New York Convention. Still, these actions may not guarantee that future arbitral
awards will be enforced without attempts to review their substance. Recent evidence from Russia,
Indonesia, and Pakistan suggests that domestic courts are frequently tempted to put aside foreign
arbitration awards to protect domestic companies (Isaacson, 2002).
The second factor that determines the probability of enforcement, π ( ⋅) , is product
complexity. Complex products, such as machines and even mass-produced clothing, contain
many characteristics. These characteristics—for example, whether T-shirts should conform with
Italian, French or US standards for size, material and colors, whether a user’s manual for a
complex machine is user friendly, whether a belt-loop for a particular shirt is fashionable, etc.—
are numerous, subjective (as in the case of fashion or user-friendliness) and highly differentiated
across otherwise similar products. When there is substantial product complexity it becomes more
difficult for a court to make a correct ruling because it is difficult for the court to verify whether
the character of the exporter’s shipment fulfills the letter and spirit of the contract. For similar
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reasons, it becomes more difficult for agencies that implement court rulings to be effective when
products are more complex. Summarizing the discussion, then

π = π ( I exp , c) : ∂π / ∂I exp > 0, ∂π / ∂c < 0 for π ∈[0,1)

(3)

where Iexp denotes the quality of exporter institutions.
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1) and differentiating, then

∂r / ∂I exp = (1+ψ ) * ∂π / ∂I exp ( ∂δ / ∂π * (1 − π ) + (1 − δ ) ) > 0

(4)

∂r / ∂c = (1+ψ )[ (1 − π )( ∂δ / ∂π * ∂π / ∂c + ∂δ / ∂c) + (1 − δ )∂π / ∂c ) < 0 (5)
Therefore, an improvement in the quality of exporter institutions increases π , which then raises
the probability that the exporter makes a good faith effort. This raises the probability that the
importer is satisfied, and that the importer is compensated if there is a breach of contract, which
in turn, increases r. An increase in product complexity directly lowers the probability that the
importer is satisfied, and also lowers the probability that the importer is compensated if there is a
breach of contract. This provides an exporter with a greater incentive to shirk, and consequently
lowers the probability that the importer is satisfied. Thus, overall, an increase in c lowers r.
Differentiating (4) with respect to c, then

∂ 2 r / ∂I exp ∂c = − (1+ψ ) * ∂π / ∂I exp [ ∂δ / ∂π * ∂ π / ∂c + ∂ δ / ∂c] > 0

(6)

Equation (6) establishes the connection between the quality of exporter institutions, defined as
their commitment to be impartial, and product complexity. Because contracts for complex
products are less complete than contracts for simple products, they are more vulnerable to
disputes, and they lower r. Therefore, better institutions in the exporter country dampen the
marginal negative impact of complexity on r, and the cross derivative is positive.
Finally, the share of surviving products,

ϕ (c, I exp , I imp , ⋅ ) = r (c, I exp ) ⋅ s ( I imp ) ⋅τ ( ⋅) ∈ [0,1) , has the properties established in equations
(4)-(6) and is increasing in Iimp.
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III. Institutions, Transaction and Production Costs
In order to generate predictions about the impact of institutions on trade, we incorporate
transaction and domestic production costs into a general equilibrium model based upon Rudiger
Dornbusch et al (1977) (proofs of results are in the Appendix). There are two countries (home
and foreign); two simple products denoted S and S* that can be produced only by the home and
foreign country, and a continuum of equally complex products distributed on z ∈ [0,1] . The
labor and institutional endowments in the home and foreign country are (L, I) and (L*,I*).
Because competitive outsourcing of parts production on the domestic market requires low
transaction costs, high transaction costs enforce potentially inefficient in-house production.
Therefore, we call this a production cost effect of legal institutions. Good domestic institutions
discourage predators and also offset domestic suppliers’ incentive to shirk. Because the cost of
predation does not depend upon product complexity, while shirking is more lucrative for complex
products, an improvement in domestic institutions lowers production costs of complex relative to
simple products and, thereby, increases a country’s comparative advantage in complex products.
To capture this, we assume that producing either simple product requires one labor unit. Let a(z)/I
and a*(z)/I* denote production (unit labor costs) for complex product z in the domestic and
foreign country. Thus, better domestic institutions lower the relative production cost of complex
products.
We sort products by comparative advantage. The home country has a falling comparative
advantage in complex products:

A( z , I , I *) ≡ a * ( z ) I / a( z ) I *, where ∂A / ∂z < 0;
∂A / ∂I = A / I ; ∂A / ∂I * = − A / I *

(7)

The representative agents in each country have the same utility function

U ( S , S *, x( z )) = (1− β ) ln(S ρ + S * ρ ) + β ln ∫10 ln x( z )dz
where { β , 1 − β } ∈ (0, 1) are shares of income spent on simple and complex products,
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(8)

ρ = 1 − (1 / σ ), σ is the elasticity of substitution within simple products, and the elasticity of
substitution across complex products is one. We assume that S and S* are relatively closer
substitutes than complex products:

σ >1

(9)

Thus, in complex product markets consumers buy the entire continuum and spend the same
amount of money on each product. However, in simple product markets consumers spend less on
S and more on S* as the price of S relative to S* increases.
The home country takes into account transaction costs as well as home and foreign
production costs when it decides whether to produce or import the zth complex product.
Specifically, the home country produces all z for which its unit labor costs are lowest:

wa ( z ) / I ≤ w * a * ( z ) /{I * ⋅r (c =1, I *) ⋅ s ( I ) ⋅τ (⋅)}

(10)

where c = 0, 1 denotes the simple and complex product, w and w* are the home and foreign
wage rate; the home country produces all z ≤ z 2 , and imports otherwise. The right side of
equation (10) shows that an increase in the quality of foreign (exporter) institutions lowers
transaction and production costs by impacting the terms 1/r(c=1,I*) and 1/I*. The left side shows
that the quality of home (importer) institutions impacts only home production costs. Equation
(10) can be rewritten:

ω ≡ w / w * ≤ A( z , I , I *) / { r (c =1, I *) ⋅ s( I ) ⋅τ (⋅)}

(10*)

where ω is the relative wage. Similarly, the foreign country produces all z , satisfying:

wa ( z ) /{I ⋅ r (c =1, I ) ⋅ s ( I *) ⋅τ (⋅)} ≥ w * a * ( z ) / I *

(11)

This can be rewritten:

ω ≥ A( z, I , I *) ⋅{ r (c =1, I ) ⋅ s ( I *) ⋅τ (⋅)}

(11*)

The foreign country produces all z ≤ z1 , and imports otherwise. Solving (10*) and (11*)
as strict equalities, then z 1 < z 2 , and the home country imports complex goods z ∈( z 2 ,1], the
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foreign country imports complex goods z ∈ [0, z1 ), and there is an interval of complex nontradeables z ∈ [ z1 , z 2 ].
Because there are constant returns to scale in production, there are zero profits in a
competitive equilibrium. Normalizing the foreign wage to unity, the sale price of simple product
S in the home country is ω , and the sale price of S* in the foreign country is one.
If the foreign country imports S, its price of S relative to S* is

Ps (ω , I *, I ) = ω / { r (c = 0, I ) ⋅ s ( I *) ⋅τ (⋅)}
*

(12)

If, however, the home country imports S*, its price of S relative to S* is

Ps (ω , I *, I ) = ω ⋅ r (c = 0, I *) ⋅ s ( I ) ⋅τ (⋅)

(13)

Solving the representative agent’s utility function, the share of income that the home and foreign
countries spend on S is σ 1 (ω , I, I*) = (1− β ) ⋅ (1 + {Ps (ω , I , I *)}σ −1 ) −1 and

σ 1* (ω , I, I*) = (1− β ) ⋅ (1 + {Ps * (ω , I , I *)}σ −1 ) −1 . Payments to laborers producing S are

ω Lsimple = σ 1 (ω , I , I *) ⋅ ωL + σ 1* (ω , I , I *) ⋅ L

(14)

where ωL and L* denote home and foreign income (normalized by the relative wage).
Consumers spend a share β of their income on complex products and spend the same
amount of money on each complex product. Because the home country produces complex
products on the interval [0, z2], and the foreign imports from the home country on [0, z1], the total
payments to labor in the home complex sector are

ω Lcomplex = β ⋅{z 2ω L + z1 L*}

(15)

Substituting the identity Lsimple + Lcomplex = L into (14) and (15), summing and converting to logs,
ω is expressed as an implicit function:

Γ(ω , z1 , z 2 ; I , I *) = ln ω + ln L + ln{1 − {β z 2 + σ 1 (ω , z1 , z 2 )}
− ln L * − ln{1 − {β z1 + σ 1 (ω , z1 , z 2 )} ≡ 0
*

12

(16)

Our interest is in characterizing the impact of exporter and importer institutions on trade
flows. We limit the analysis to the most empirically relevant case, in which there is two-way
trade in simple and complex products (accounting for 81% of all non-missing cases), and derive
the foreign country’s equilibrium import expenditures on complex and simple products (all results
apply for home country imports). Using (14) and (15), the logs of foreign import expenditures are

log M *

simple

= log σ 1 (ω , I , I *) + log L *

(17)

log M *

complex

= log β + log z1 + log L *

(18)

*

Solving equations (10*) and (11*) as strict equalities and using equation (16), we obtain a
system of three equations for which z1 , z 2 and ω are functions of I and I*. Assuming an
equilibrium exists, we totally differentiate the system defined by (16), (10*) and (11*) with
respect to I (exporter institutions) and I* (importer institutions):

∂ log M *

complex

/ ∂ log I = ∂ log M *

complex

∂ log M *

complex

/ ∂ log I production > 0; ∂ log M *

∂ log M *

complex

/ ∂ log I * = ∂ log M *

∂ log M *

complex

/ ∂ log I * production < 0; ∂ log M *

/ ∂ log I production + ∂ log M *

complex

complex

complex

/ ∂ log I transaction > 0 :

/ ∂ log I transaction > 0

/ ∂ log I * production + ∂ log M *
complex

(19)
complex

/ ∂ log I *transaction = ? :

/ ∂ log I *transaction > 0

(20)

Equations (19) and (20) break down the impact of exporter (home) and importer (foreign)
institutions on complex product imports into production and transaction cost components.
According to (19), following an improvement in exporter institutions, the foreign (importer)
country's comparative advantage falls because the exporter can produce complex products
relatively more cheaply. Furthermore, the foreign (importer) country's transaction costs also fall
because its risk of receiving shoddy complex products from an exporter with better institutions is
lower. Thus, by both the production and transaction cost effects complex imports increase. By
(20), following an improvement in domestic institutions, the foreign (importer) country's
comparative advantage in complex products increases, and its transaction cost fall because better
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domestic institutions lower its predation risk at its border. Thus, complex imports decrease by the
production effect and increase by the transaction effect, and the overall impact of an improvement
in importer institutions is ambiguous.
Regarding foreign imports of simple products:

∂ log M *

simple

/ ∂ log I = ∂ log M *

simple

∂ log M *

simple

/ ∂ log I production < 0; ∂ log M *

∂ log M *

simple

/ ∂ log I * = ∂ log M *

∂ log M *

simple

/ ∂ log I * production > 0; ∂ log M *

/ ∂ log I production + ∂ log M *

simple

simple

simple

/ ∂ log I transaction = ?:

/ ∂ log I transaction = ?

/ ∂ log I * production + ∂ log M *
simple

(21)
simple

/ ∂ log I *transaction > 0;

/ ∂ log I *transaction = ?

(22)

Because a gain in comparative advantage in the complex sector implies growing
comparative disadvantage in the simple sector, the production cost effects of exporter and
importer institutions for simple products have the opposite sign in their impact on complex
product markets. The impacts of institutions on transaction costs are ambiguous in simple product
markets. However, for reasons that are spelled out in the Appendix, the overall effect of importer
institutions (production plus transaction costs) on simple product imports is positive under very
general conditions, while the overall effect of exporter institutions is ambiguous.
The model also predicts that the sum of production effects in both markets is zero:
i

i

∂ log M * / ∂ log I production + ∂ log M * / ∂ log I * production = 0 :
i = simple, complex.

(23)

Equation (23) implies that we can isolate the impact of exporter and importer institutions
by analyzing transaction costs:
i

i

∂ log M * / ∂ log I + ∂ log M * / ∂ log I * =
i

i

∂ log M * / ∂ log I transaction + ∂ log M * / ∂ log I *transaction

(24)

where the sign of (24) is strictly positive and ambiguous for complex and simple products.
From the results derived in equations (19)-(24), several testable predictions emerge.
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Proposition 1. The overall effect of importer institutions on complex product imports is negative
if and only if their production effect dominates their transaction effect (i.e., the absolute effect of
production costs dominates the absolute impact of transaction costs). If the production effects of
importer institutions dominate, then the overall absolute effect of exporter institutions is stronger
than importer institutions in complex product markets.
Proof. See the Appendix.

Proposition 2. If the production effect of exporter institutions in simple product markets
dominates their transaction effect, then the overall impact of importer institutions in simple
product imports is negative.
Proof. See the Appendix.

In the remainder of this paper, we take these predictions to the data.

IV. Data
The data comes from a variety of sources. The national accounts data is collected from
the IMF Financial Statistical Yearbook, the gravity controls are taken from Rauch (1999). We use
the 1990 values throughout.6 Data on the quality of institutions comes from the International
Country Risk Guide. This data is constructed as an annual index from a simple average of quality
ratings of institutions by country. Each rating ranges from one to ten with ten representing the
highest quality. For our purpose, we include in these ratings an average of indices of rule of law,

6

This only poses a problem for the language variable, since in some countries with large immigration
activities, these numbers may not be constant. However, we think the variations are generally small enough
to not change the results in any significant way.
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expropriation risk, corruption in government, and bureaucratic quality.7 We do not include
expropriation risk and ethnic tensions in the averages we used for our econometric exercise, since
those dimensions do not fit the concept of legal quality we introduced.8 Summary statistics for the
average index number we used in the estimation can be found in Table 1a. Trade data is obtained
from the World Trade Database compiled by Statistics Canada. To categorize the products into
different degrees of complexity, we employ the classification developed by Rauch (1999). Since
complexity cannot be determined directly, he sorts four digit SITC industries into trading
categories: those goods that are predominantly traded on organized exchanges (metals, pork),
those that are reference priced (chemicals, fertilizers) and those that neither have reference prices
nor are traded on organized exchanges (e.g., shoes, cars and machinery). We reinterpret this
classification in terms of product complexity, where “organized exchange” denotes low
complexity (simple) and “neither” captures high complexity.9 In Table 1b, we report summary
statistics of the relative importance of simple versus complex products. There are 55 countries
(see Table 1c) in the data set, and all variables are either fixed or reported on an annual basis from
1982 to 1992.

V. Estimation
In this section, we describe our econometric strategy. We first integrate our two-country
results into a multi-country world. Next we discuss the estimation equation that results from this
mapping. Finally, we discuss further econometric issues.

7

Source is the International Country Risk Guide used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Kaufmann
(1999). We thank Stephen Knack for providing this data. The other indices are risk of repudiation of
government contracts and ethnic tensions. Our results our robust to the inclusion of these two indices into
our average index of institutional quality. All six of the indices are highly correlated and could also be
aggregated using principal components.
8
However, it should be noted that all results are robust with the inclusion of these two dimensions.
9
All results for “reference priced”, which one might interpret as mid-complexity, are generally consistent
with the model we present and are available from the authors upon request.
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As Eaton and Kortum (2002) have shown, the Ricardian Model of Dornbusch et al.
(1977) in a multi-country setting leads to a gravity specification of bilateral trade-flows. Our setup differs from theirs in two important aspects. First, we differentiate by the types of goods, since
we introduce both a simple and a complex products sector. We assume that each national
economy is fully described by these two sectors: only the complex goods sector is identical to the
Dornbusch et al. (1977) specification. Second, we utilize a mechanism that influences both
domestic production and international transaction costs.10 We therefore estimate the empirical
model:

IM ijtk = α i + α j + β k X ijt + γ k I it + δ k I jt + ε ijtk

(25)

where IMijtk denotes the dollar value of imports originating from country j and shipped to
country i in year t and industry group k. Similarly, Xijt contains the standard gravity variables
including GDP and GDP per capita for each country11, distance between the two countries, and
whether or not the countries share a common border, have colonial ties, share languages or are
remote. The coefficients αi and αj are associated with country dummy variables. Whenever a
country is part of a bilateral trading relationship, this dummy variable assumes a value of 1; the
variable is zero otherwise. This guarantees that country-specific effects for both exporters and
importers, which can be assumed constant over our eleven-year period (such as geography and
infrastructure in general) are absorbed. Our variables of interest are Iit and Ijt, which denote the
quality level of the exporter’s and importer’s legal institutions, hereafter referred to simply as
institutions.12

10

These two differences require changes in the estimation equation relative to theirs, as well as in the
interpretation of the coefficients, since changes in the quality of legal institutions cannot be interpreted as
being similar to a national technology effect.
11
It is important to note that GDP and GDP per capita were entered separately in the regression, since the
quality of legal institutions is highly correlated with GDP per capita (ρ=0.82)
12
This specification simplifies the Eaton and Kortum (2002) specification because it excludes the effect of
changes in all other countries’ legal qualities on a particular country-pair’s bilateral imports. This, however,
will only cause omitted variable bias if there is correlation between the importer’s quality of legal
institutions and all other countries’ quality of institutions corrected by distance and other impediments to
trade. This bias, however, seems negligible.
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Finally, a feature of the gravity model regressions, which is problematic for calculating
standard errors, is that the same country’s characteristics will be represented on the right hand
side repeatedly. Defining these repetitions as groups, error terms within those groups are likely to
correlated with each other, while error terms across groups should not correlate. In order to
account for this grouping effect, we replace the traditional Huber-White errors (White, 1980) with
robust standard errors that additionally account for within-group correlation. As a result, our
standard errors are considerably higher than those normally reported, and this hurts the statistical
significance of our estimates. However, we include this adjustment in an effort to produce the
most cautious estimates.
VI. Results
The predictions of the model from Section 3 for the case of two-way trade in all categories are
reproduced in the following table:
Table 2: Predictions of the Model
Importer Institutions
Production Transaction

Complex

-

+

Products

Exporter Institutions

Overall
⇔
Production
dominate
Transaction
Effects

Production Transaction

+

+

Overall

+

Relative
Impact of
Institutions
Complex

If Production Effect of Importer Institutions dominates, then
 Overall Importer Institutions <  Overall Exporter Institutions

Markets
Simple

+

?

+

Products
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-

?

if
Production
dominate
Transaction
Effects

The model therefore delivers several testable implications when the production cost
effect of importer institutions (that is, the effect of importers’ institutions on comparative
advantage) dominates the transaction cost effect, and the production cost effect of exporter
institutions dominates in simple markets. Under these general assumptions, the model predicts
that in complex markets the coefficient for exporter institutions is positive, the coefficient for
importer institutions is negative, and exporter institutions have the greatest absolute impact. In
simple markets the coefficients for importer and exporter institutions are reversed. We would
expect the sum of coefficients for exporter and importer institutions in complex product markets
to be strictly positive since the sum of these coefficients adds up to the sum of transaction cost
effects, which are each strictly positive. Finally, our model does not generate these clear
predictions about the impact of institutions on transaction costs in simple product markets.
In order to test these predictions, we proceed in three steps. First, to best compare our
results with A&M (2001), we estimate the effect of institutions on overall imports. Next, we
repeat this exercise for complex and simple imports. Finally, we use disaggregated data of all 471
SITC industries in our panel and employ a difference-in-difference estimator that allows us to
control for a larger number of influences.
Table 3 reports results for the estimation of the effect of institutions on imports. In the
first column, we present the results of our estimates when institutions are excluded. We note that
all variables have the expected sign and are of a reasonable order of magnitude.13 In Column 2,
we include importer and exporter institutions. We confirm the A&M (2001) result that importer
institutions have a positive effect on imports. However, we also find that exporter institutions
matter more than importer institutions: the hypothesis that exporter and importer have the same
effect can be rejected at a 10% level. To check the robustness of our results, we first include
country-dummies to control for country-specific effects (for example, geography) and then add
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year dummies to control for overall time effects (for example, average growth or technology
effects) into our regression. Both sets of dummies erase the effects of GDP. They also render the
effect of importer institutions on trade insignificant. However, the effect of exporter institutions
on trade survives these robustness checks, and we are able to reject the hypothesis that importer
and exporter legal institutions have the same effect at the 5% level.
In the second step, we re-estimate equation (25) for complex and simple imports. The
results are reported in Table 4. Regarding complex products, recall that our model predicts that
the impact of exporter institutions is always positive. Furthermore, when the production cost
effect of importer institutions dominates transaction cost effects, the effect of importer institutions
is negative, and exporter institutions have the greatest absolute impact. All of the estimated
coefficients match these predictions. The hypothesis that the absolute effect of exporter and
importer institutions is equal is rejected at the 5% level when country dummies are included, and
at the 1% level when both country and time dummies are included. This suggests that the
production cost effect actually dominates the transaction cost effect. Finally, recalling equation
(24), the sum of coefficients for exporter and importer institutions equals the sum of their
transaction cost effects, and the model predicts this sum to be strictly positive. The estimates are
consistent with this prediction: they are 0.85 – 0.51 = 0.34 and 0.93 – 0.44 = 0.49 when country
dummies or both country and time dummies are included.
Regarding simple products, our model predicts that the effect of importer institutions is
always positive. Furthermore, when the production cost effect of exporter institutions dominates,
better exporter institutions lower simple product imports. The coefficient estimates for importer
and exporter institutions reported in Columns 2 and 4 (where the country dummies and the
country and time dummies are included) support these predictions, and suggest that the
production cost effect of exporter institutions dominates. While the sum of exporter and importer
institution coefficients equals their sum of transaction cost effects, the model makes no clear
13

Language is an exception, however, it is statistically insignificant.
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prediction about the expected sign of this sum. In both estimates the sum of transaction cost
effects is 0.66 – 0.53 = 0.13, which is marginally positive and always less than the corresponding
sum of transaction costs for complex imports. Thus, the model provides evidence that general
equilibrium transaction costs are greater in complex markets.
All estimated coefficients can be interpreted as in the following example: A 10%
increase in the legal quality of an exporting country will – on average – lead to about a 9%
increase in complex goods exports of that country. This means – again on average – that an
increase in rating value from 6.5 to 7.15 in 1990 for the United States would have led to an
increase in exports of about $30 billion worth of complex goods.
In our third and last step, we subject these findings to a robustness check and modify
equation 25:

IM ijtk = Fijt + γDI it + δDI jt + ε ijtk

(26)

where k now represents all 471 SITC industries in our sample, and Fijt are fixed effects that
absorb country-pair year effects. This specification sweeps away all standard gravity variables,
and therefore Xijt is no longer included in the regression. Regarding product groups, D is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the industry falls into the complex products category, and
equal to zero if it is in the simple products category.14 This technique is known as “difference-indifference estimation” (see, for a very nice example, Athey and Stern (2002)). In our case, we
cannot estimate the effect of importer or exporter institutions per se. All we can estimate is the
differential effect of these institutions on our “treatment group,” that is, industries in the complex
goods sector that refers to the first difference. The second difference is the change in the quality
of institutions over time. Since we eliminate all other effects, we are left solely with the
differential effect of institutions on complex relative to simple products.

14

We dropped all intermediate goods industries. Again, however, our results are robust with these
exclusions, and are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5 reports the results of this estimation. The first column refers exactly to the
specification in equation (26). Regarding complex relative to simple products, we find that
exporter institutions have a positive effect and importer institutions have a negative effect.
Comparing the coefficient sizes with Table 4, Columns 1 and 2, we should have expected a
coefficient on exporter institutions of around 1.36 (0.85 + 0.51, since this time we measure
relative to simple products) and around -1.2 (-0.53 – 0.66) for importer institutions. The actual
estimates we get are quite close (1.58 for exporter institutions and –1.01 for importer institutions).
As another robustness check, we include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor. The results
(reported in Column 2) are robust regarding these inclusions. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 replace

the country-pair-year dummies with a substantially larger set of country-year-two-digit
industry dummies with and without a lagged dependent variable. In both cases, exporter
institutions have a positive effect on complex imports relative to simple imports, while importer
institutions have a negative effect. Table 5 then confirms that the results reported in table 4 are
strongly robust.

VII. Conclusion
Drawing on the theory of incomplete contracts, we have argued that good legal
institutions located in an exporter’s domicile are critical for trade in complex products because
they offset the exporter’s incentive to breach contract. The analysis has shown that these
institutions impact the exporter’s ability to outsource on the domestic market and to sell on world
markets. The effect of institutions on national transaction costs should influence comparative
advantage in complex products, while their effect on international transaction costs should
influence the costs of exporting complex products. Furthermore, drawing on the work of A&M
(2001), we have noted that good institutions located in importer’s country influence trade by
lowering predation risk. When we embedded these claims into a general equilibrium model, we
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found that, under general conditions, strong legal institutions in the exporter’s domicile increase
its comparative advantage in complex goods production and lower its comparative advantage in
simple goods production. Furthermore, good legal institution in an importer’s country lead to a
shift away from complex goods imports into simple goods imports.
We took these claims to the data and found that legal institutions have a major impact on
overall trade flows. We also found the effects predicted by the model to be present in the data.
These findings have important implications: political actors can change institutions and,
thereby, indirectly influence the industrial structure in their countries. These issues are of
especially high importance for developing countries. We will explore the effect of legal
institutions on developing countries in future research.
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics Quality of Legal Institutions

Overall
(year = 1990)

Statistics

Value
(Index Number)

Average

4.59

Min

1

Max

7

Standard Deviation
Change over
Estimation Period
1982-1992

1.65
-55%
-19%
-15%
208%
145%
157%

Decreasers
Increasers

Countries close to
value
Brazil, Chile,
Malaysia
Iran, Bolivia,
Indonesia, Nigeria
Switzerland,
Belgium, Denmark
Ethiopia
Hong Kong
South Africa
Iran
Egypt
Morocco

Table 1b: Complexity Intensiveness of Exports*

Overall
(year = 1990)

Statistics

Value

Average

10.7

Min

0.02

Max

165

Standard Deviation
Change over
Estimation Period
1982-1992

24.5
-64%
-18%
-16%
1,406%
3,185%
5,375%

Decreasers
Increasers

Countries close to
value
France, Ireland,
Spain
Iran, Nigeria, SaudiArabia
Japan, Hong Kong,
Switzerland
Ghana
Hong Kong
Paraguay
Indonesia
Mexico
Venezuela

*Ratio (using US dollar values) of Complex Products to Simple Product Exports
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Table 1c: List of countries
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bel-Lux
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada

Ecuador
Egypt
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany, FR
Ghana

New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines

South Africa
Spain
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey

Greece

Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Korea,
Republic
Malaysia

Chile

Poland

Hong Kong
Hungary
India

Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands

Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Singapore

United
Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

China
Colombia
Denmark
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Table 3: Import Regressions Pooled for 1982-1992
Overall Trade
Regression
Column
GDP importer
GDP exporter
GDP per capita importer
GDP per capita exporter
Distance
Adjacent
Links
Language similarities
Remoteness

1

2

3

4

0.81
(39.07)
0.77
(39.78)
0.72
(23.30)
1.04
(32.09)
-1.12
(-27.30)
0.31
(2.33)
0.51
(4.91)
-0.09
(-0.54)
0.37
(3.79)

0.81
(38.53)
0.76
(39.13)
0.53
(11.16)
0.74
(13.96)
-1.16
(-27.97)
0.35
(2.43)
0.42
(4.07)
0.09
(0.51)
0.58
(6.04)
0.61
(5.41)
0.91
(7.12)

-0.10
(-0.43)
-0.13
(-0.60)
1.00
(3.80)
1.20
(4.50)
-1.02
(-27.09)
0.40
(2.64)
0.45
(4.42)
0.99
(5.72)
1.46
(2.21)
0.17
(0.18)
0.32
(3.07)

-0.15
(-0.52)
-0.19
(-0.65)
1.18
(4.00)
1.39
(4.63)
-1.03
(-27.11)
0.40
(2.65)
0.45
(4.40)
1.00
(5.74)
1.79
(2.31)
0.05
(0.51)
0.36
(3.26)

0.076

0.035

0.035

Yes

Yes
Yes

2792
(countrypairs)
0.77
23,564

2792
(countrypairs)
0.77
23,564

Quality of importer legal institutions
Quality of exporter legal institutions
Probability that the quality of legal
institution coefficients are the same
Country-dummies
Time-dummies
Constant
Number of Clusters
R2
Observations

-20.04
(-12.13)
2792
(countrypairs)
0.69
26,577

-21.45
(-13.16)
2792
(countrypairs)
0.70
23,564

T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors
that account for within-group correlation.
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Table 4: Import Regressions Pooled for 1982-1992, Complex vs. Simple Goods
Regression
Column
GDP importer
GDP exporter
GDP per capita importer
GDP per capita exporter
Distance
Adjacent
Links
Language similarities
Remoteness
Quality of importer institutions
Quality of exporter institutions
Probability that the absolute value of the
quality of institutions coefficients are the
same
Country-dummies
Time-dummies
Number of Clusters
R2
Observations

1

2

3

4

Complex
0.34
(1.65)
0.58
(2.82)
0.77
(3.16)
0.71
(2.92)
-0.98
(-24.90)
0.44
(2.62)
0.54
(5.11)
1.27
(6.73)
-0.81
(-1.30)
-0.51
(-5.18)
0.85
(7.92)

Simple
-1.50
(-4.59)
-1.81
(-5.55)
2.35
(6.05)
2.27
(5.77)
-1.26
(-22.76)
0.27
(1.55)
0.18
(1.21)
0.11
(0.41)
7.83
(7.91)
0.66
(4.54)
-0.53
(-3.66)

Complex
0.08
(0.27)
0.32
(1.08)
1.17
(4.05)
1.10
(3.86)
-0.98
(-24.98)
0.44
(2.62)
0.54
(5.09)
1.28
(6.77)
0.74
(0.96)
-0.44
(-4.24)
0.93
(8.41)

Simple
-1.06
(-2.52)
-1.38
(-3.26)
2.03
(4.70)
1.95
(4.48)
-1.26
(-22.72)
0.27
(1.54)
0.18
(1.22)
0.11
(0.40)
6.69
(5.50)
0.66
(4.42)
-0.53
(-3.45)

0.02

0.54

0.00

0.53

Yes

Yes

2755
(countrypairs)
0.79
22,669

2550
(countrypairs)
0.50
18,948

Yes
Yes
2755
(countrypairs)
0.79
22,669

Yes
Yes
2550
(countrypairs)
0.38
18,948

T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors
that account for within-group correlation.
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Table 5: Import Regressions Pooled for 1982-1992, all 471 industries
Regression
Column

1

2

3

4

-1.01
(-34.97)
1.58
(56.70)

0.86
(1,159)
-0.79*
(-12.41)
1.65*
(26.46)

-0.44
(-15.61)
0.62
(22.62)

0.80
(1,187)
-0.45*
(-5.46)
0.76*
(9.27)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

884,644
(country-yeartwodigit-pairs)
0.60
3,354,262

793,468
(country-yeartwodigit-pairs)
0.85
3,062,340

Lagged dependent variable
Quality of importer institutions
interacted with complexity dummy
Quality of exporter institutions
interacted with complexity dummy
Probability that the absolute value
of the quality of institution
coefficients are the same
Country-pair year-dummies
Country-pair year-two-digit
industry-dummies
Number of Clusters
R2
Observations

29,938
(countryyear-pairs)
0.41
3,354,262

26,504
(countryyear-pairs)
0.84
3,062,340

T-statistics reported in parentheses are computed from robust standard errors
that account for within-group correlation.
* coefficients transformed: beta/(1-rho)
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